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ARTICLES
Animal Rights Unraveled: Why Abolitionism
Collapses into Welfarism and What it Means for
Animal Ethics
LUIS E. CHIESA*
ABSTRACT
Most people support laws that seek to reduce the suffering of animals. Yet
animal cruelty statutes and other kinds of animal welfare laws are under
sustained attack by the so-called abolitionists. Animal rights abolitionists claim
that it is categorically wrong to treat animals as commodities, and animal
welfare laws should be opposed because they do not alter the property status of
animals. Abolitionists also claim that animal welfare regulations do not meaning-
fully reduce animal suffering. In fact, abolitionists argue that such statutes likely
increase future animal suffering, either by delaying the advent of abolition or by
soothing the conscience of those who want to continue consumption of animal
products. This Article contends that this claim is false and in tension with the core
philosophical commitments of abolitionism. There is simply no empirical evi-
dence that supports the counterintuitive claim that animal welfare laws do not
meaningfully reduce animal suffering. In fact, both intuition and the few empiri-
cal studies that exist suggest that animal welfare statutes do reduce animal
suffering. If animal welfare regulations succeed in meaningfully reducing animal
suffering, then abolitionists must confront what this Article calls the “abolition-
ist’s dilemma.” On the one hand, abolitionists could embrace animal welfare
regulations, in which case their core opposition to laws that presuppose the
property status of animals would be compromised. On the other hand, they could
oppose animal welfare regulations that reduce animal suffering solely because
they continue to commoditize animals. This would reveal that abolitionists are
willing to sacrifice animal welfare in the present with the hopes of achieving an
* Professor of Law and Director of the Buffalo Criminal Law Center, SUNY Buffalo Law School. I am
indebted to the speakers and audience of the “Animal Ethics: Abolition, Regulation or Citizenship” conference
held at Rutgers Law School on April 11, 2014, where I presented an earlier version of this Article. I am also
thankful to Professor Leo Zaibert and the students in his Philosophy of Law seminar for allowing me to discuss
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uncertain and unlikely abolition in the future. Not caring about present animal
suffering would make the abolitionist position not only politically unpalatable,
but also ethically unattractive in a most profound kind of way. As a result,
abolitionists should embrace animal welfare statutes that meaningfully reduce
suffering, even if doing so means that the abolitionist program as we know it
would cease to exist.
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INTRODUCTION
To the uninitiated, animal ethics may seem like a monolithic field. While
obvious differences exist between the steak-eating, leather-wearing dog-lover
who encourages all his friends to adopt rescue dogs; the vegan who stopped
consuming meat-derived products for ethical reasons; and the unapologetic,
card-carrying member of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”);
they all seem to be brought together by a deep commitment to reducing the
suffering of nonhuman animals. Some focus on dogs, others want to put an end to
animal experimentation, while others want to abolish the property status of all
nonhuman animals. Putting aside the different objectives, all of these activists
devote a considerable part of their lives to advancing the causes of nonhuman
animals.
One would think that the steak-eating dog-lover and the ethical vegan have
something in common. After all, both devote some part of their lives to
promoting animal welfare. Upon closer inspection, however, there are significant
differences between these groups of people. The differences are of such import
that it would seem wrong to lump them together in the same group. Although
both the dog-lover and the ethical vegan care about animal suffering, the ethical
views that undergird their respective commitments to nonhuman animals are
radically different. Three significant differences immediately come to mind.
First, the dog-lover mostly cares about a particular species of animal, whereas the
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ethical vegan cares about all nonhuman animals. Second, the dog-lover feels a
strong personal and emotional connection to the animals that she cares about
(dogs and perhaps other domestic animals), whereas she does not feel a
particularly strong emotional bond with the animals that she cares less about
(cows, chicken, pigs, etc.). The ethical vegan, in turn, abstains from consuming
meat regardless of whether she feels personally and emotionally connected with
the animals. Third, the dog-lover is primarily concerned with preventing the
infliction of physical and emotional pain on the animals that she cares about. In
contrast, ethical vegans frequently object to the legal and social practice of
treating animals as commodities or resources, even if such treatment does not
directly inflict physical or emotional pain.
The differences between the dog-lover and the ethical vegan reflect important
philosophical differences amongst animal advocates. More specifically, these
differences are reflective of the common divide between “welfarists” who
advocate for increased animal welfare and “abolitionists” who advocate for
abolition of the property status of animals.1 While both welfarists and abolition-
ists believe that nonhuman animals deserve serious moral consideration because
they are sentient,2 they part ways in the implications that they draw from this
basic insight.
For welfarists, the fact that nonhuman animals are sentient makes their
suffering count as morally relevant.3 As a result, welfarists strive to reduce
unjustifiable inflictions of pain on all sentient beings, regardless of whether they
are human or nonhuman. Although welfarists would prefer to eliminate all
unjustifiable inflictions of pain on animals, they support any measure that
incrementally reduces animal suffering, even if such measures do not completely
eliminate it.4 Furthermore, welfarists typically—although not necessarily—
defend a consequentialist approach to morality in general and to animal ethics in
particular. That is, welfarists believe that the right thing to do is whatever course
of conduct produces the best consequences.
Abolitionists—like welfarists—believe that nonhuman animals with the capac-
ity to feel pain are deserving of a special moral status. Unlike welfarists, however,
abolitionists claim that sentient animals should not only be protected from
1. For a discussion of the welfarist/abolitionist debate, see Corey Wrenn, Abolitionist Animal Rights: Critical
Comparisons and Challenges within the Animal Rights Movement, 4 INTERFACE 438 (2012), http://www.
interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Interface-4-2-Wrenn.pdf.
2. Arguably, some nonhuman animals are not sentient. That is, it is possible—even likely—that some
nonhuman animals lack the capacity to feel pain. The most obvious examples would be insects. See VICTORIA
BRAITHWAITE, DO FISH FEEL PAIN? 33, 40, 44–45 (2010) (stating that insects lack the ability to feel pain likely
because they lack consciousness, which is likely, although inconclusively, the connection between nociception
(“the unconscious recognition by the nervous system that damage is occurring somewhere”) and pain (“the
emotional sensation that whatever is damaged is hurting”)). Mollusks arguably also lack the capacity to feel
pain, although this is increasingly being contested. Id. at 119, 121–22, 132–34.
3. Wrenn, supra note 1, at 445.
4. Id.
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unjustifiable inflictions of pain, but also considered full-fledged members of the
moral community. Therefore, abolitionists argue that sentient nonhuman animals
are as deserving of moral consideration as human beings. Abolitionists are also
committed to a deontological approach to morality grounded—at least in part—in
Kant’s non-instrumental view of ethics. According to Kant’s categorical impera-
tive, it is morally wrong to use human beings as a means to an end, regardless of
how desirable achieving that end may be.5 Because abolitionists believe human
and sentient nonhuman animals are worthy of equal moral consideration, they
argue that animals—like humans—should not be used as means to an end, for
that would objectify them in a morally objectionable manner. As a result,
abolitionists oppose treating animals as resources or commodities, in much the
same way that anti-slavery abolitionists opposed treating humans as chattel.6
This leads them to conclude that it is morally wrong to consume animals, even if
the animals consumed never suffer.7
It is at this point that abolitionists and welfarists radically diverge. Abolition-
ists oppose animal ownership, even if the animal is treated humanely. The
ownership of the creature is in and of itself morally objectionable because it
objectifies the animal in a way that violates the imperative to treat sentient
creatures as ends in themselves. In contrast, welfarists are not opposed—at least
in principle—to ownership of animals, for they oppose inflicting needless
suffering on the creatures, rather than their status as property.
Because abolitionists claim it is categorically wrong to treat an animal as
property regardless of whether the animal suffers or not, it should come as no
surprise that abolitionists oppose animal welfare laws, since these statutes
continue to presuppose the property status of animals.8 Interestingly, abolitionists
routinely point out that they oppose animal welfare reforms not only because they
presuppose the property status of animals, but also because such reforms are
unlikely to reduce animal suffering. In fact, abolitionists argue that such statutes
likely increase future animal suffering either by delaying the advent of abolition
or by soothing the conscience of those who want to continue consuming animal
products.
This Article contends that this claim is false and in tension with the core
philosophical commitments of abolitionism. There is simply no empirical evi-
dence that supports the counterintuitive claim that animal welfare laws do not
5. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 11 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2008),
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf.
6. Wrenn, supra note 1, at 448.
7. This assumes that the animal lives a life free of suffering and is killed without pain or advance notice.
8. See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, What to Do on Proposition 2?, ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE ABOLITIONIST APPROACH
(Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/what-to-do-on-proposition-2/#.VtMon-YlJ6I (opposing
California’s Proposition 2); see also Sherry Colb Responds to My Post on Proposition 2, ANIMAL BLAWG (Oct.
31, 2008), https://animalblawg.wordpress.com/2008/10/31/sherry-colb-resonds-to-my-post-on-proposition-2/
(also opposing Prop. 2).
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meaningfully reduce animal suffering. In fact, both intuition and the few
empirical studies that exist suggest that animal welfare statutes do reduce animal
suffering.9 If animal welfare regulations succeed in meaningfully reducing
animal suffering, then abolitionists must confront what this Article calls the
“abolitionist’s dilemma.” On the one hand, abolitionists could embrace animal
welfare regulations, in which case their core opposition to laws that presuppose
the property status of animals would be compromised. On the other hand, they
could oppose animal welfare regulations that reduce animal suffering solely
because they continue to commoditize animals. This would reveal that abolition-
ists are willing to sacrifice animal welfare in the present with the hopes of
achieving an uncertain and unlikely abolition in the future. Not caring about
present animal suffering would make the abolitionist position not only politically
unpalatable, but also ethically unattractive in a profound way. As a result,
abolitionists should embrace animal welfare statutes that meaningfully reduce
suffering, even if doing so means that the abolitionist program as we know it
would cease to exist.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the differences between
abolitionists and welfarists. It identifies abolitionism with the core claim that it is
categorically wrong to treat animals as property. In contrast, welfarists are unified
by their commitment to reduce animal suffering rather than abolishing the
property status of animals.
Part II explains why abolitionism falls prey to the so-called “abolitionist’s
dilemma” once it supplements its core non-consequentialist opposition to animal
welfare statutes with the view that animal welfare reform should also be opposed
because it will likely increase future animal suffering. This claim reveals a
fundamental tension in abolitionism that cannot be resolved unless abolitionism
morphs into a kind of welfarism or is reduced to the eccentric view that animals
should continue to suffer until their status as property is abolished. The first way
out of the dilemma compromises the core philosophical commitment of abolition-
ism, whereas the second offers a profoundly unattractive approach to animal
ethics.
Part III considers and rejects various “avoidance strategies” that abolitionists
may put forth in order to avoid falling prey to the abolitionist’s dilemma. The
Article concludes by pointing out that once abolitionism is collapsed into a form
of welfarism, there is little reason for abolitionists to refuse to cooperate with
welfarist reforms that meaningfully reduce animal suffering. This state of affairs
is likely to be more conducive to the wellbeing of nonhuman animals than the
current abolitionist-welfarist divide.
9. See infra section II.A.
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I. ABOLITIONISM AND WELFARISM DISTINGUISHED
According to Francione, the central tenet of abolitionism is a “rejection of the
notion that animal life has a lesser value than human life.”10 Expressed in positive
terms, the chief claim of abolitionism is that animal and human life are of equal
value. After advancing this basic tenet, abolitionists go on to claim that animals
and humans “are equal for the purpose of not being treated as resources.”11 Given
this claim, abolitionists argue that—just like it is universally considered immoral
to treat humans as property—treating animals as property should be considered
immoral as well.12 Consequently, abolitionists argue that the ultimate goal of
animal rights advocates should be the abolition of the property status of
animals.13
Those who confront the abolitionist thesis for the first time will likely find the
claim that human and animal lives are equally valuable as counterintuitive. Thus,
the casual reader may ask why abolitionists believe animals and humans should
have equal moral worth. The answer, as is usually the case with moral theories
regarding animal rights, lies in the fact that animals, like humans, are sentient
beings capable of feeling pain. In the words of Francione:
[A]ll sentient beings—human or nonhuman—are equal for the purpose of not
being treated as resources, just as an intellectually gifted human and a mentally
disabled human are equal for the purpose of not being used as a forced organ
donor or as a non-consenting subject in a painful biomedical experiment.14
Furthermore—and perhaps more importantly—abolitionists deny there is any
morally relevant distinction between the abilities diverse beings have for feeling
different kinds of pain.15 As a result, abolitionists believe that although some
humans may have the ability to experience certain kinds of pain that animals
cannot experience (for example, agonizing over how a future confrontation will
go), this is not a morally relevant basis for discriminating between the two. Once
again, in the words of Francione:
The rights/abolitionist position rejects the notion that any differences that may
exist between human and animal minds mean that animals have no interest in
continuing to exist or that the sentient experiences of nonhumans have a lesser
weight than those of humans . . . . This deficiency or difference may be relevant
for some purposes, but it does not allow us to conclude that a human lacking the
10. GARY L. FRANCIONE & ROBERT GARNER, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE: ABOLITION OR REGULATION? 5
(Gary L. Francione & Gary Steiner eds., 2010) [hereinafter ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE].
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 4.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 15.
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capacities that [some philosophers] identif[y] as giving value to life does not
have an interest in continuing to live or that death is not a harm for her.16
According to Francione, the basic distinction between welfarists and abolition-
ists is that welfarists reject the claim that the lives of nonhuman animals and
humans are of equal value.17 More specifically, he claims that welfarists believe
that human lives are worth more than animal lives.18 Francione is certainly
correct that Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill believed animal lives were of
less value than human lives.19 As Francione points out, Mill believed that “[i]t is
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.”20 Nevertheless, I
think Francione is mistaken to equate the views of more modern welfarists with
those of Bentham and Mill in this regard. The view of Peter Singer is
demonstrative.
Singer argues that the basic interest of all beings, humans and animals, is to be
free from suffering.21 Furthermore, Singer claims that the interest humans and
animals have against suffering is, ceteris paribus, equal.22 Since Singer’s
utilitarianism focuses on suffering rather than on death, his philosophy does not
commit him to the broad conclusion that animal life is worth less than human
life.23 Properly understood, Singer’s philosophy leads to the conclusion that
whether a being’s death causes more suffering than another being’s death
depends on morally relevant features of the beings that are compared, rather than
on the species of the compared beings.
Given that Singer’s philosophy would look at the morally relevant characteris-
tics of the different beings in order to decide which has the stronger interests, his
views will likely be very context dependent. Thus, for example, Singer is likely to
conclude that the death of a normally functioning human is as harmful as the
death of a normally functioning great ape. Great apes are highly intelligent beings
with strong emotions and capacity to forge long-term relationships with family
and unrelated members of their species.24 They can also solve complex puzzles,
learn hundreds of signs, construct grammatically correct sentences, and display a
16. Id. at 15, 17.
17. Id. at 10.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 9 (quoting John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 279, 281 (Alan
Ryan ed., 1987)).
21. See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 18.
24. THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1994). See
also Genetic Evidence, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM oF NAT. HIST. (Feb. 26, 2016), http://humanorigins.si.edu/
evidence/genetics (discussing how the closeness of human and ape DNA translates to physical and mental
characteristics); Seth Bornstein, What Were They Thinking? Studies Reveal Animal Intellect, NBC NEWS (June
24, 2012, 6:02 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/47940997/ns/technology_and_science-science/t/what-were-
they-thinking-studies-reveal-animal-intellect/#.V7sY7GW8z8s.
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sense of justice that leads them to resent those who do not reciprocate favors.25 In
sum, great apes display many mental and emotional features that greatly
resemble our own. These traits reveal that great apes have both emotional and
social needs.26 They also reveal that great apes are capable of achieving a
considerable degree of awareness, including some degree of self-awareness.27
Given these similarities, Singer has argued that great apes should have rights to
life, liberty, and freedom from torture and unjustifiable inflictions of pain.28
These, of course, are basic rights that our society currently only affords to human
beings. Therefore, at least as far as great apes are concerned, Singer’s philosophy
argues in favor of granting human and nonhuman animals the same kinds of
fundamental rights.29
In some cases, a welfarist approach to animal ethics, such as the one espoused
by Singer, may lead to giving some nonhuman animals a stronger claim to moral
protection than some humans.30 An example includes comparing the moral
claims of a severely disabled human infant with the moral claims of a full-grown
great ape. A welfarist may believe that the life of a great ape is worth more than
that of the severely disabled child, given that the ape has a higher degree of
self-awareness and can engage in more meaningful social relationships than the
severely disabled infant can. Peter Singer has (in)famously advanced such an
argument. According to Singer,
Adult chimpanzees, dogs, pigs, and members of many other species far surpass
the brain-damaged infant in their ability to relate to others, act independently,
be self-aware, and any other capacity that could reasonably be said to give
value to life. With the most intensive care possible, some severely retarded
infants can never achieve the intelligence level of a dog.31
For similar reasons, Singer argues that the lives of certain nonhuman animals
are more valuable than the lives of humans with advanced senility:
[T]here will surely be some nonhuman animals whose lives, by any standards,
are more valuable than the lives of some humans. A chimpanzee, dog, or pig,
for instance, will have a higher degree of self-awareness and a greater capacity
for meaningful relations with others than a severely retarded infant or someone
25. Peter Singer, Great Apes Deserve Life, Liberty and the Prohibition of Torture, THE GUARDIAN, (May 26,
2006, 7:03 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/may/27/comment.animalwelfare.
26. Id.
27. Self-awareness is defined as “[c]onscious knowledge of one’s own character, feelings, motives, and
desires.” OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/self-
awareness (last visited Oct. 29, 2016). Some research suggests that there are several levels of self-awareness.
See, e.g., Philippe Rochat, Five Levels of Self-Awareness as They Unfold Early in Life, 12 CONSCIOUSNESS &
COGNITION 717, 717 (2003), http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/Rochat5levels.pdf.
28. Singer, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. SINGER, supra note 21, at 18.
31. Id.
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in a state of advanced senility. So if we base the right to life on these
characteristics we must grant these animals a right to life as good as, or better
than, such retarded or senile humans.32
The same kinds of arguments are put forth by some welfarists to justify
affording different value to the lives of different human beings. Singer has
argued, for example, that not all human life is of equal value. More specifically,
he contends that the lives of adult human beings are more valuable than the lives
of infants.33 The morally relevant difference between these beings is, once again,
not their species. Rather, it is that adult humans have a capacity for rationality and
self-awareness that infants lack. Singer is quite explicit in rejecting the notion
that belonging to the homo sapiens race makes a difference in the moral calculus
in this and other cases:
[T]he fact that a being is a human being, in the sense of a member of the species
Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather,
characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness that make a
difference. Infants lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be
equated with killing normal human beings, or any other self-conscious be-
ings . . . . No infant . . . has as strong a claim to life as beings capable of seeing
themselves as distinct entities, existing over time.34
Note that what is doing the work here is not the species of the being, but
whether the being possesses certain cognitive capabilities. Some humans possess
these cognitive capabilities and some animals possess them as well. This
approach, while perhaps abhorrent to some,35 is not, I believe, “speciecist,”36 for
the discrimination is not on the basis of species, but rather on the basis of other
traits.
Many abolitionists invoke the famous Tom Regan example of a dog in a
lifeboat37 to highlight the differences between abolitionist and welfarist ap-
proaches to animal ethics. In this example, four adult humans and a dog are adrift
in a lifeboat. The boat is taking in water and one being must be thrown overboard
in order for the boat to stay afloat and the rest to survive.38 Francione suggests
that Singer in particular, and welfarist philosophy in general, are committed to
32. Id. at 19.
33. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 182 (2d 1993).
34. Id.
35. Even if the approach were conceptually coherent, many would be appalled by an ethical approach that
claims that some human lives are more valuable than others.
36. Speciecism is unjust discrimination against members of a different species. See Hugh Lafollette & Niall
Shanks, The Origin of Speciecism, 71 PHILOSOPHY 41, 41 (1996). The charge is typically leveled against humans
who unjustly discriminate against nonhuman animals solely on the basis of species.
37. TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 324 (1983).
38. Id.
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saving the humans at the expense of the dog.39 In my opinion, the welfarist
answer to the question is not necessarily “the human,” as Francione suggests. The
answer is that it depends on what kind of human and what kind of animal. More
information is needed. Between saving a newborn child or a dog, Singerian
philosophy may very well lead to saving the dog as the right moral answer. This
may be a shortcoming of the theory. It may be the wrong outcome. It is not,
however, discrimination on the basis of species.
If one digs deeper into Francione’s actual criticism of Singer’s philosophy, it
seems the biggest problem Francione has with welfarists like Singer is that the
traits identified by Singer as morally relevant for distinguishing between the
interests of different beings are actually not morally relevant. Francione takes
issue, for example, with Singer’s claim that the capacity of self-awareness and
projecting oneself into the future is morally relevant.40 According to Singer, a
being’s capacity to think about what is yet to come and to have expectations and
desires about possible futures is of considerable moral significance.41 In terms of
comparing the value of the lives of beings who possess and lack this capacity,
Singer argues that “there is greater significance in killing a being who has plans
for the future—who wishes to accomplish things—than there is in killing a being
who is incapable of thinking about the future at all but exists either moment to
moment or within a very short-time horizon . . . .”42 Therefore, Singer concludes
that, other things being equal, it is “much less a tragedy to kill that sort of being
than to kill someone who wants to live long enough to do the sorts of things that
humans typically want to achieve over the course of their lives.”43
It is perhaps Singer’s emphasis on traits that allow beings to engage in the kind
of thought processes and actions that humans typically engage in that leads
Francione to believe that Singer privileges human beings over nonhuman
animals.44 While superficially plausible, this interpretation of Singer’s welfarist
approach to animal ethics is mistaken. As Singer himself makes clear, the moral
relevance of the capacities of self-awareness and projecting oneself into the
future cut both in favor and against privileging humans over nonhuman ani-
mals.45 It is true that welfarists like Singer generally believe that the lives
of normally functioning adults who are capable of self-awareness are more
valuable than the lives of the many nonhuman animals incapable of self-
awareness. However, such welfarists also believe that the lives of nonhuman
39. Gary L. Francione, Peter Singer and the Welfarist Position on the Lesser Value of Nonhuman Life,
ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE ABOLITIONIST APPROACH (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/peter-singer-
and-the-welfarist-position-on-the-lesser-value-of-nonhuman-life/#.VtOaQ-YlJ6I.
40. Id.
41. Peter Singer, Speciesism and Moral Status, 40 METAPHILOSOPHY 567, 576 (2009).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Francione, supra note 39.
45. Singer, supra note 41, at 576.
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animals that possess self-awareness are as valuable as the lives of normally
functioning humans and that the lives of humans who lack such self-awareness
are less valuable than the lives of both human and nonhuman animals that possess
such capacity. Singer is quite clear on this, as he argues that if one believes that it
is justifiable to kill a humanely raised nonhuman animal for food because it lacks
the capacity to project itself into the future, then the logical implication is to hold
that it is justifiable to non-voluntarily “end[] the life of a profoundly cognitively
disabled human being.”46
Finally, it is important to note that welfarists believe human and nonhuman
animals should be treated alike for the purposes of being kept free from
unjustifiable inflictions of pain.47 Whether the animal is capable of self-
awareness is irrelevant to this, as the only morally relevant consideration in this
context is whether the being is capable of feeling pain. Thus, Singer argues that
“pain and suffering are equally bad—and pleasure and happiness equally good—
whether the being experiencing them is human or nonhuman, rational or
nonrational, capable of discourse or not.”48 The capacity for self-awareness is
only relevant to welfarists when assessing the strength of a being’s interest in
continued existence (i.e., not dying or staying alive).49 Even then, focusing on
this capacity does not automatically lead to giving more weight to human lives as
compared to nonhuman animal lives. Rather, it privileges human and nonhuman
animals that possess this characteristic over human and nonhuman animals that
lack it. In sum, “death is a greater or lesser loss depending on factors like the
extent to which the being was aware of his or her existence over time, and of
course the quality of life the being was likely to have, had it continued to live.”50
The distinction is thus drawn on the basis of morally relevant traits rather than on
the basis of species membership.
Therefore, even if Francione is correct that welfarists like Singer believe that
some nonhuman animals do not have a right to life because they lack self-
awareness, it does not reveal that Singer is a speciecist. It only reveals that Singer
is drawing incorrect lines between sentient beings across the board rather than
between humans and animals. As numerous scholars have pointed out, Singer has
drawn considerably more flack for his views regarding the different values of
human lives (e.g. newborns versus adults), than he has for his views regarding
animals.51
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Rob Loftis, Review: Refuting Peter Singer’s Ethical Theory, 6 METAPSYCHOLOGY ONLINE REVS.,
no. 29 (2002), http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?typebook&id1257&cn135 (re-
viewing SUSAN LUFKIN KRANZ, REFUTING PETER SINGER’S ETHICAL THEORY: THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN
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In my opinion, what really binds all welfarists together is a commitment to
consequentialist ethics that compels them to strive to reduce the suffering of
sentient beings (humans and animals included), rather than a commitment to the
principle that human life is worth more than animal life. While some welfarists
believe that animal life is usually worth less than human life, there is no
necessary connection between the consequentialist principle that commands to
reduce suffering, and the conclusion that human life is worth more than animal
life. Therefore, and contrary to what abolitionists like Francione argue, there is
conceptual breathing room for a form of welfarism that does not accept as a
central tenet the principle that human life is worth more than animal life.
If there is a significant difference between abolitionists and welfarists, it is not
the relative value that they attach to human and animal lives. Rather, it is the
different goals they pursue. Abolitionists believe the ultimate goal of animal
advocacy should be to abolish the property status of animals. Welfarists, in
contrast, believe the ultimate goal of animal advocacy should be to eliminate
suffering of animals. These goals may, but need not, coincide.
II. THE ABOLITIONIST’S DILEMMA
How should abolitionists react when confronted with a regulation that mean-
ingfully decreases animal suffering? If they embrace such regulations, their core
opposition to laws that presuppose the property status of animals would be
compromised. On the other hand, opposition to such regulations solely because
they continue to commoditize animals would reveal that abolitionists are willing
to sacrifice animal welfare in the present with hopes of achieving an uncertain
and unlikely abolition in the future. Abolitionists thus face what I call the
“abolitionist’s dilemma.” Either they embrace effective animal welfare regula-
tions, which risks collapsing the conceptual foundations of their position, or they
oppose such regulation, which would reveal that their position is callous and
insensitive. The remainder of this section is devoted to fleshing out in more detail
this abolitionist dilemma.
Because the ultimate goal of abolitionism is to abolish the property status of
animals, abolitionists believe it is morally objectionable to eat animals, regard-
less of how humanely they were raised.52 As a result, abolitionists argue that
veganism is the only lifestyle/diet that is not morally objectionable.53 This lays
the groundwork for the practical strategy of abolitionism. Since eating animals
necessarily assumes that the creatures are property, abolitionists tend to oppose
DIGNITY (2001)). The author points out that the “shocking aspect of Singer’s beliefs” is illustrated by Singer’s
conclusion that “it is wrong to eat a cow, but it is sometimes ok to kill a baby.” Id.
52. See ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 10, at 199–200, 215–16, 255–56.
53. Gary L. Francione, Abolitionist Animal Rights/Abolitionist Veganism: in a Nutshell, ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE
ABOLITIONIST APPROACH (Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/abolitionist-animal-rights-
abolitionist-veganism-in-a-nutshell/#.VtOVg-YlJ6I.
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campaigns to enhance the welfare of animals that are nevertheless destined for
the slaughterhouse.54 Therefore, abolitionists argue that the only morally accept-
able practical strategy is advocating for veganism.55 This leads to a general
reticence to support classic animal welfare causes, such as getting rid of battery
cages.56 Some abolitionists even oppose animal cruelty statutes in their current
form, arguing that such laws serve mostly to soothe the conscience of those who
want to continue to consume animal products.57 Instead, these abolitionists
suggest that animal advocates focus their efforts on promoting veganism rather
than on enacting more animal cruelty statutes. Sherry Colb’s thoughts on this
matter are representative:
I wonder whether it would be better for nonhuman animals if there were no
laws at all protecting them against cruelty. On the one hand, such laws . . . re-
flect the desire to do right by our fellow, sentient earthlings, an impulse that is
worthy of praise and encouragement. On the other hand, we might be better off
directing our animal-friendly feelings to letting people know how easy,
enjoyable, and healthy it is to be a vegan . . . .58
Abolitionists like Francione and Colb have refused to support almost all
animal welfare reforms, arguing not only that they are morally objectionable
because they continue to assume animals are property, but also that the reforms
are useless and a waste of resources because they are unlikely to alleviate animal
suffering in any significant way.59 Abolitionists who take this view believe most
proponents of animal cruelty legislation are not going to give up the consumption
of animal products. As a result, they contend that animal welfare legislation—
including animal cruelty statutes in their current form—will likely make people
more comfortable with continuing to consume animals, given that the laws on the
books that purport to protect animals make them feel better about the way in
which the animals they consume are being treated. This, in turn, may very well
lead to increased animal consumption and, therefore, increased animal suffer-
ing.60 Once again, the views of Colb are illustrative:
54. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, An Empty Gesture to Soothe the Conscience: Why We Pass Laws Protecting
Chimpanzees And Other Animals from Cruelty, FINDLAW (Mar. 4, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/
20090304.html.
55. Francione, supra note 53.
56. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 8.
57. Colb, supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
125–30 (1996) (arguing that the new welfarism erroneously relies on the requirement of necessity to be
“sufficiently flexible” to reduce and eventually eliminate animal suffering because necessity leads to a
balancing test between rightholders (humans) and nonrightholders (animals). In this test, the rightholder
consistently wins, so the only way to alleviate animal suffering is to make them a rightholder by eliminating
their legal status as property.); see also Colb, supra note 54.
60. Colb, supra note 54.
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The overwhelming majority of people who support anti-cruelty legislation are
strongly opposed to giving up the consumption of animals. Thus, rather than
viewing the (several-years-in-the-future) modest enlargement of factory farm
animal cages as a “first step” toward the dismantling of animal cruelty, many
people are likely instead to view it as a reason to feel better about consuming
animals. In other words, the symbolic gesture of anti-cruelty laws serves to
calm some of the dissonance that people might have previously felt about
eating, wearing and otherwise using tortured and killed animals.
If this is the case, then the likely effect of such legislation is to inspire people
to consume more, rather than less, of what the animal industry has to offer,
because they can now tell themselves that what happens to animals is no longer
objectionable. Perhaps the role of such legislation as a salve to the troubled
conscience explains why various actors within the meat, dairy, and egg
industries actually support measures that purport to curb those very actors’
abuses. Laws that do little to change how business is done can provide free
advertising for the idea of the so-called “conscientious omnivore.”61
There are at least two reasons why this abolitionist claim is problematic. First,
the claim that animal welfare statutes will likely lead to increased animal
suffering in the future is empirical. As such, the claim needs to be substantiated
with empirical evidence and may be defeated by empirical evidence. To date,
abolitionists have failed to provide any empirical support for their claim.62 To
make matters worse, what little empirical evidence is currently available tends to
undermine the abolitionist claim rather than confirm it.
The second problem with the abolitionist claim is that, given the philosophical
underpinnings of the movement, abolitionists could very well be content to
oppose animal welfare legislation solely by pointing out that they run afoul of the
abolitionist principle that nonhuman animals should not be commoditized. It is
unclear what exactly abolitionists gain by making the additional—and controver-
sial—claim that these laws do not do much to lessen animal suffering. In fact, I
will argue that abolitionists feel the need to make this additional claim because a
purely deontological version of abolitionism is too eccentric to serve as the
linchpin of a pragmatic approach to animal advocacy.
In what follows, I will flesh out in more detail the two problems raised by the
abolitionist claim that animal welfare statutes should be opposed because they
will likely end up increasing animal suffering in the future. I will first focus on the
lack of empirical support for this claim. This is followed by a discussion of how
the claim highlights an inherent tension in abolitionist philosophy and how this
tension threatens to unravel the edifice upon which abolitionism is erected.
61. Id.
62. See infra Part II.A.
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A. LACK OF EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR ABOLITIONIST CLAIMS
Regardless of the confidence with which abolitionists make the claim that
welfare measures today will increase future consumption of meat, this is an
empirical claim that lacks empirical support.63 Without solid empirical support,
the abolitionist claim, while plausible, is pure speculation. Furthermore, the only
empirical study on the subject actually points opposite to the prediction of
abolitionists. A 2011 Kansas State University (“KSU”) study regarding the
impact of welfarist advocacy on meat-eating patterns reported the following
relevant findings: (1) media attention to animal welfare has significant, negative
effects on meat demand in the United States; (2) the direct effects of media
attention are primarily associated with pork and poultry demand; and (3)
increasing media attention to animal welfare issues triggers consumers to
purchase less meat, rather than to reallocate expenditures across competing meat
products.64 From these findings, the authors of the study drew two implications.
First, that United States livestock producers and industry leaders must recognize
that meat demand is affected by discussions and negotiations regarding legisla-
tively triggered production practice requirements.65 Second, that the influence of
media on total meat expenditure suggests that beef, pork, and poultry producers
may be well served by collaborating in recognizing and responding to changing
societal pressures regarding animal welfare.66
In his blog, Francione suggests that this study is methodologically flawed,67
but even if the study’s conclusions are ultimately unsound, the fact that the
authors attempted to empirically test whether animal welfare efforts decrease
animal suffering is a step in the right direction. Abolitionists and welfarists alike
are making strong empirical claims that seem essential to many of the positions
that both philosophical camps hold. In particular, abolitionists make two strong
empirical claims: (a) welfare advocacy does not reduce animal suffering now;
and (b) even if welfare advocacy does reduce animal suffering now, it delays
future abolition and will therefore likely increase animal suffering in the long
run.68 To support these claims, abolitionists have suggested that when welfarists
successfully target a particular meat industry, the demand simply switches to a
63. The only empirical study to date that attempts to quantify whether animal welfare regulations increase
future consumption of meat is Glynn T. Tonsor & Nicole J. Olynk, Impacts of Animal Well-Being and Welfare
Media on Meat Demand, 62 J. AGRIC. ECON. 59 (2011). The study fails to find empirical support for the
proposition that animal welfare laws increase future animal consumption.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 68–69.
66. Id.
67. Gary L. Francione, Science Weighs In: Animal Welfare Reform is Useless, ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE
ABOLITIONIST APPROACH (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/science-weighs-in-animal-welfare-
reform-is-useless/#.VtTG5pMrJ24.
68. See Colb, supra note 54.
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different industry.69 That is, while welfarists will perhaps succeed in reducing
demand of meat product X now, it will only shift consumer preferences from
meat product X to meat product Y, as opposed to shifting them to non-meat
products.
The KSU study seems to be in tension with both abolitionist claims. This is not
to say the findings are correct or that abolitionists cannot contest the tensions
between the findings of the study and their claims. However, when confronted
with an empirical study that relates to central issues in the abolitionist-welfarist
debate, abolitionists must do more than simply dismiss the study. Instead,
abolitionists should support their critiques with additional empirical studies. The
ball is in their court.
This last point raises another important issue in this debate. It is what I call the
“burden of proof” problem. Both abolitionists and welfarists are making empiri-
cal claims, but which side has the burden of proving their claims? Must
abolitionists empirically prove (1) that welfare advocacy does not reduce animal
suffering, and (2) that it delays abolition, thereby increasing future animal
suffering, or may they legitimately require that welfarists first prove that their
advocacy reduces animal suffering today? By the same token, must welfarists
who claim that welfare advocacy reduces animal suffering now prove their claim
empirically, or may they legitimately require abolitionists to prove empirically
that their welfarist efforts do not reduce animal suffering now?
My sense is that the burden of proof is on the abolitionists, because their claim
is more counterintuitive.70 Consider Proposition 2 in California as an example.71
Without additional information, a measure like Proposition 2 that requires calves
raised for veal, egg-laying hens, and pregnant pigs to be confined only in ways
that allow these animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn
around freely seems to intuitively reduce the suffering of animals subjected to the
new treatment. It is counterintuitive to suggest otherwise. Therefore, those who
make the counterintuitive claim that such measures do not reduce animal
suffering have the burden of proving their claims.
Of course, there are reasons why Proposition 2 may not reduce animal
suffering in the long run. Francione has pointed out many of them in his blog,
but—once again—his claims are mostly empirical. For example, according to
Francione (writing in 2008):
Proposition 2 will do nothing to reduce animal suffering in the short term.
Proposition 2 will not even come into effect, if at all, until 2015. Proposition 2
has numerous exceptions and qualifications and even if it does come into effect
69. Id.
70. For a defense of the argument that those who make counterintuitive claims have the burden of proving
them, see FREDERICK FERRÉ, KNOWING AND VALUE: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE POSTMODERN EPISTEMOLOGY
187–88 (1998).
71. Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–25994 (Deering 2015).
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at some point in the distant future, and even if it is enforced, it will result in no
meaningful reduction in animal suffering.72
Francione’s claims in the excerpted paragraph are bare bone conclusions
without empirical support. He posits that Proposition 2 will not result in a
meaningful reduction in animal suffering, but he does not explain why this is
so.73 Francione then asserts that Proposition 2 will only make people feel better
about exploiting animals, thus increasing animal suffering in the future and
delaying abolition.74 This, too, is an empirical claim that requires empirical
support. Given such strong, seemingly counterintuitive claims, certainly the
burden is on Francione and other abolitionists to find and present supporting
empirical studies.
Francione does offer one often repeated explanation. He says animal welfare
has existed for 200 years, and its end result is that animal exploitation is now
considerably higher than it was 200 years ago, before animal welfare activism.
He believes this provides empirical support for his claim that animal welfare
reforms do not reduce animal suffering.75 With respect, this is a non sequitur.
First, it is just as likely that without animal welfare advocacy, even more animals
would be suffering today than those that are currently suffering. An empirical
study would be welcome to test which of these two claims is more accurate.
Second, Francione’s statement might suggest a correlation between animal
advocacy over the last 200 years and an increase in animal suffering, but not
causation. It is entirely plausible that the increase in animal suffering over the last
200 years has been the product of factors that have little to do with animal
advocacy. The most obvious cause is the emergence of new technologies that
have made it incredibly easy and profitable to produce food in a way that
mistreats animals.76 In other words, the increased animal suffering may be a
product of the emergence of the modern factory farm. Importantly, this is a
development that emerged independently of any welfare activism, for farmers
may have likely adopted these modern practices in the interests of efficiency.
Whether this history is more plausible than the one offered by Francione remains
to be seen. It is clear, however, that Francione’s history does not amount to
empirical proof about the failure of animal welfare.
72. Francione, supra note 8.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Gary Francione, The Abolitionist Approach and Farm Sanctuary Discuss “Happy Meat,” Abolition, and
Welfare Reform, ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE ABOLITIONIST APPROACH (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.abolitionistapproach.
com/the-abolitionist-approach-and-farm-sanctuary-discuss-happy-meat-abolition-and-welfare-reform/
#.V6ERUM6cFdg.
76. Because of the rise of large-scale industrial agriculture and factory farming, meat production has tripled
over the last forty years. See generally Global Meat Production and Consumption Continue to Rise,
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.worldwatch.org/global-meat-production-and-consumption-
continue-rise-1.
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In any case, even if we assume that welfarists, rather than abolitionists, have
the burden of proof regarding their claims, the KSU study may very well meet the
welfarist burden of proof. Therefore, the burden is still on abolitionists to show
that animal advocacy—at least the kind of animal advocacy that was the basis for
that study—does not reduce animal suffering now, or that it reduces animal
suffering now but increases animal suffering down the road. This burden shifting
occurs even if the study is flawed. The findings lend support to welfarist claims.77
In response, abolitionists should submit countervailing empirical studies, not
additional unsupported rhetoric.
B. CONTRADICTIONS IN THE ABOLITIONIST ARGUMENTS AGAINST
ANIMAL WELFARE LAWS
Abolitionists believe that we should oppose animal welfare laws because they
perpetuate the property status of nonhuman animals.78 According to this view,
legislation banning conventional battery cages should be opposed because such
laws do nothing to change the status of caged animals.79 After enactment of these
statutes, the animals at issue remain commodities, just as they were before. This
position is based on the deontological principle that it is categorically wrong to
treat nonhuman animals as resources for human consumption. Deontological
arguments cannot be defeated by pointing out that bad consequences will ensue
from following the deontological rule. Therefore, insofar as these statutes
continue to treat nonhuman animals as commodities, no amount of evidence
tending to prove that animal suffering will decrease if these laws are enacted will
suffice to defeat the deontological argument that it is categorically wrong to treat
animals as property.
In contrast, the abolitionist argument—that we should oppose animal welfare
legislation because it will probably end up increasing animal suffering in the
future—is not based on the deontological principle that it is wrong to treat
animals as resources. Instead, it is premised on a prediction that animal welfare
legislation will end up increasing the suffering of animals rather than decreasing
it,80 as proponents of the legislation argue. That prediction may very well be
wrong. This begs the question regarding why abolitionists decided to put forth a
thesis that could be proved wrong when they can just rely on deontological
arguments that cannot be falsified empirically. Unlike arguments based on the
deontological principle that commands that animals not be treated as property,
this argument for opposing animal welfare laws could be defeated by showing
that such laws do, in fact, alleviate animal suffering in a meaningful way. It is
77. Francione, supra note 53.
78. Wrenn, supra note 1.
79. Colb, supra note 54.
80. Id.
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somewhat puzzling that abolitionists feel compelled to oppose animal welfare
legislation by making the empirical claim that these laws are not likely to
decrease animal suffering in the long run. Given the philosophical underpinnings
of the movement, abolitionists could very well be content to oppose animal
welfare legislation solely by pointing out that they run afoul of the abolitionist
principle that nonhuman animals should not be commoditized. It is unclear what
exactly abolitionists gain by making the additional—and controversial—claim
that these laws do not significantly lessen animal suffering.
An analogy to the American anti-slavery abolitionist movement illustrates why
it is somewhat puzzling for the animal ethics abolitionist to make an empirical
argument against animal welfare laws. The standard claim of American anti-
slavery abolitionists was that slavery was categorically wrong because it treated
black persons as commodities. Doing so violated their human dignity and
equality.81 Abolitionists could find no morally relevant reason why the lives of
white persons were more valuable than the lives of black persons. Therefore,
morality required treating black and white persons equally. This, in turn, entailed
abolishing the property status of black slaves.82 Given that this argument appeals
to the deontological principles of equality and basic dignity, abolitionists would
oppose any law purporting to make slaves more happy on the basis of deontologi-
cal principle rather than on consequentialist grounds. Any statute designed to
increase the happiness of slaves would coherently be objected to by anti-slavery
abolitionists because it presupposes exactly what they found morally abhorrent—
the property status of blacks.83 It would be quite puzzling for anti-slavery
abolitionists to oppose laws designed to make slave lives happier by pointing out
that such statutes would not really make slaves happier. The success of the
anti-slavery abolitionist position would not be measured by whether its preferred
outcome (freedom of slaves) reduced suffering. Instead, it would be measured by
whether the preferred outcome restored the equality of blacks and whites. What it
ultimately cared about, in sum, was status, not suffering.84 This view is expressed
quite forcefully in an 1839 abolitionist text entitled Anti-Slavery Principles and
Proceedings:
The opposition of the abolitionists to slavery does not rest on the supposition
that the slaves are not kindly treated, or that they are not happy. In many
instances they undoubtedly experience all the kindness that is compatible with
the unnatural condition in which they are placed by that act of fundamental
unkindness, which dooms them from their birth to a state of bondage, “the
continuance of which,” as William Pinkney said, “is as shameful as its origin.”
81. Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y, Anti-Slavery Principles & Proceedings, 25 THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER & GEN.
REV. 228, 234 (1839).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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As for the alleged happiness of the slaves, the advertisements of runaway
servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, cooks, &c. [sic], which crowd every South-
ern newspaper, might excite some doubts with regard to the fact. But if it be
true indeed, it is so much the worse. For we hold with Edmund Burke, that
“nothing makes a happy slave but a degraded man. In proportion as the mind
grows callous to its degradation, and all sense of manly pride is lost, the slave
feels comfort.” Abolitionists contend for the abolition of slavery, simply
because it is absolutely wrong and morally impossible for a man to hold
property in his fellow-man.85
This does not mean, of course, that anti-slavery abolitionists were indifferent
to the suffering of slaves. Most believed that abolition would likely decrease
suffering. Their abolitionist position, however, did not depend on whether freeing
slaves actually ended up decreasing their suffering. Diminished suffering would
be a salutary side effect of abolition, but abolition was an end in itself, not merely
a means to the end of relieving suffering.86
Given the parallels between the anti-slavery abolitionist movement and the
animal rights abolitionist movement, one would think that both abolitionists
would adopt similar positions regarding the enactment of laws that are designed
to reduce suffering while continuing to presuppose the property status that they
are objecting to. In other words, it would seem sensible for the animal rights
abolitionist to both oppose laws designed to reduce animal suffering without
changing their property status and be mostly indifferent to whether such laws
reduce animal suffering or not. Nevertheless, the animal ethics abolitionist—
unlike the anti-slavery abolitionist—seems to care profoundly about whether
laws designed to reduce suffering of the being they are trying to liberate actually
do reduce suffering. This calls for an explanation. Why does the animal ethics
abolitionist seemingly care so much about whether animal welfare laws actually
do reduce suffering, when—like the anti-slavery abolitionist—she could simply
point out that whether such statutes reduce suffering is entirely beside the point,
since the ultimate objective of the movement is to abolish the property status of
animals rather than reducing the suffering of the creatures?
The answer to this question is, I think, that abolitionists know—although they
are not willing to publicly admit—that most people would likely perceive the
basic deontological abolitionist claim as eccentric. The claim that owning
animals is morally wrong simply fails to resonate with most people and,
therefore, fails to mobilize them into taking action to protect animals.
It is not difficult to see why most people would fail to empathize with the
claim that it is categorically wrong to own an animal. According to the latest
statistical information, close to sixty-five percent of Americans own a pet dog or
85. Id.
86. Id.
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cat.87 Most of these people care deeply about the pets they own. A considerable
number of dog and cat owners love their pets so much that they consider them
part of the family. Given the amount of interest that Americans show in their pets,
the pet industry has blossomed into one of the country’s most profitable
industries. Specifically, the pet industry now ranks as the seventh largest retail
industry in the United States.88 In a recent survey, one hundred percent of pet
owners reported giving their pets presents for Christmas or Hanukkah.89 About
ninety-four percent consider their pets to possess human-like personality traits.90
A similar number reported they would risk their lives for their pet.91 Close to
two-thirds of those surveyed reported taking their pets with them on vacation,
singing or dancing for a pet, and celebrating a pet’s birthday.92 Close to half of
respondents stated they take time off from work to spend time with a sick pet.93 A
similar number of people reported that they prepare special meals for their pet.94
Finally, about forty percent of those surveyed asserted that they would select a
dog over a human as their sole companion on a deserted island.95
Telling this cohort of people that it is morally objectionable to own a pet dog or
cat because it violates the deontological imperative that animals should not be
treated as property is not likely to go over well. From a strategic perspective, it is
probably ill-advised, given that this group of people accounts for more than half
of America’s population. Yet this is precisely what the fully committed abolition-
ist is required to do. In fact, Gary Francione has pointed out that pet ownership is
incompatible with abolitionism and that a true abolitionist has to be committed to
allowing domesticated animals—including dogs and cats—to go extinct:
As a practical matter, there is simply no way to have an institution of “pet”
ownership that is consistent with a sound theory of animal rights. “Pets” are
property and, as such, their valuation will ultimately be a matter of what their
“owners” decide . . . . [I]f there were two dogs left in the universe and it were
up to us as to whether they were allowed to breed . . . even if we could
guarantee that all dogs would have [loving] homes . . . we would not hesitate
for a second to bring the whole institution of “pet” ownership to an end.96
87. Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics, AM. PET PROD. ASS’N (2015–2016), http://www.
americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp.
88. The Pet Industry Services Today, ZOOM ROOM, https://www.zoomroomonline.com/the-pet-services-
industry-today/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Gary L. Francione, “Pets”: The Inherent Problems of Domestication, ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE ABOLITIONIST
APPROACH (July 31, 2012), http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/pets-the-inherent-problems-of-domestication/#.
Vr-egZMrLVo.
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This kind of rhetoric is unlikely to stir broad swaths of the population into
coalescing around the abolitionist agenda. In fact, it is likely to do the opposite.
This is likely to be the case with pet owners. If this is the case, the abolitionist will
likely need to downplay the classic abolitionist argument against the property
status of animals if she is to have any appreciable success in advancing her
agenda.
This is where the consequentialist argument against animal welfare law fits
with the abolitionist agenda. Although abolitionists would rather frame their
opposition to animal welfare laws solely in terms of the wrongness of laws that
continue to presuppose the property status of animals, pragmatic considerations
give them reasons to supplement this claim with a consequentialist argument
focusing on whether these laws actually decrease animal suffering. While the
sixty-five percent of Americans who own pets are likely not going to be swayed
by the claim that animal welfare laws should be opposed because they perpetuate
animal ownership, they are considerably more likely to oppose such statutes by
claims that their enactment would serve to increase animal suffering. In sum, the
overwhelming majority of people are inclined to pay attention to abolitionists if
they frame their thesis in terms of reducing animal suffering instead of framing it
as abolishing the property status of animals.
An alternative explanation of why animal ethics abolitionists make use of
consequentialist modes of argumentation is that—unlike the anti-slavery aboli-
tionists—animal ethics abolitionists have little reason to think their preferred
outcome is likely to come to fruition in the foreseeable future. Anti-slavery
abolitionists calling for the abolishment of the property status of blacks were
doing so with the reasonable belief that abolition could be achieved in the not so
distant future, perhaps even in their lifetimes.97 In contrast, it is doubtful animal
rights abolitionists believe abolition of the property status of animals will happen
in the near future, let alone in their lifetimes. If this is the case, animal rights
abolitionists are likely to feel more compelled than anti-slavery abolitionists to
address the question of whether suffering of beings they are trying to liberate can
be reduced in the near future.
The following thought experiment illustrates why it is difficult for
animal rights abolitionists to solely advocate for abolition of the property status
of animals without also addressing the suffering of animals prior to abolition.
Assume that Proposition X significantly reduces the suffering of nine
billion chickens per year. The chickens will, nevertheless, still be killed for
eventual human consumption.98 Assume also that Proposition X significantly
97. That abolition could be achieved in the not so distant future was particularly obvious because slavery was
abolished in northern states starting in Delaware in 1787. See Douglas Harper, Slavery in Delaware, SLAVERY IN
THE NORTH (2003), http://slavenorth.com/delaware.htm. Thus, black abolitionists were keenly aware that
abolition could be achieved.
98. The number was not picked randomly. Approximately nine billion chickens are slaughtered for food in
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reduces suffering according to whatever standards count as significant for
abolitionists.
Would abolitionists oppose Proposition X? Unfortunately, it is unclear whether
abolitionists would support or oppose a statute like this one. The abolitionist
commitment to the deontological principle that it is morally abhorrent to treat
animals as property would lead to opposing this proposition even if animal
suffering is considerably reduced by its enactment. This basic abolitionist
principle compels opposing the hypothetical statute because, although it reduces
suffering, it does nothing to change the property status of animals. On the other
hand, abolitionists often point out that they oppose animal welfare legislation not
only because such laws continue to presuppose the property status of animals, but
also because their enactment is not likely to significantly reduce animal suffer-
ing.99 Since it is stipulated that Proposition X will significantly reduce animal
suffering, abolitionists cannot oppose this hypothetical regulation by arguing that
it will not decrease animal suffering.
Confronted with this hypothetical law, abolitionists face a dilemmatic choice.
If they believe that the interest in upholding the basic deontological principle that
proscribes treating animals as property outweighs the interest in reducing the
suffering of animals, they must bite the bullet and oppose the hypothetical
legislation. If, on the other hand, they believe that the interest in reducing animal
suffering overrides the interest in not commoditizing animals, abolitionists must
support the legislation. Both choices are problematic for abolitionists. Choosing
to oppose the legislation although its enactment would reduce animal suffering
would reveal that abolitionists really care about status and not suffering. In
contrast, choosing to support Proposition X would show that abolitionists are not
fully committed to the deontological principle that forbids treating animals as
property. Either way, abolitionists are forced to considerably revise their public
discourse regarding animal welfare legislation in particular and abolitionism in
general.
From a strategic perspective, abolitionists should probably support a statute
such as Proposition X. The general public will likely be quite puzzled if
abolitionists adopt a position that would deliberately prolong animal suffering
until abolition is achieved. This is especially the case when the prospects of
animal abolition taking place in the not too distant future are quite slim.
Therefore, abolitionists would surely gain strategic purchase by shifting their
discourse from abolition of property status to diminution of animal suffering and
supporting Proposition X. But this strategic advantage is gained by downplaying
the essential deontological claim underlying abolitionist approaches to animal ethics.
the United States every year. See Lorraine Murray, Factory-Farmed Chickens: Their Difficult Lives and Deaths,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: ADVOCACY FOR ANIMALS (May 14, 2007), http://advocacy.britannica.com/blog/
advocacy/2007/05/the-difficult-lives-and-deaths-of-factory-farmed-chickens/.
99. Colb, supra note 54.
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III. ABOLITIONIST AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES
To avoid facing this dilemmatic choice, abolitionists may simply refuse to
engage with the hypothetical. They could do so by claiming the hypothetical is
unrealistic because no actual animal welfare law will result in a considerable
reduction of animal suffering. A second option would be for abolitionists to claim
that even if an animal welfare law reduces animal suffering in the near future, it is
likely to increase animal suffering in the distant future because it is probable that
such statutes will delay abolition of the property status of animals. Abolitionists
could also attempt to sidestep the dilemma by claiming that they advance the
consequentialist claim that animal welfare regulation increases suffering in order
to engage with welfarists on their own terms. Under this view, the consequential-
ist claim would not be constitutive of the abolitionist position. As a result,
nothing of much import rides on whether the claim turns out to be true. While
superficially plausible at first glance, these avoidance techniques cannot with-
stand careful scrutiny.
A. CLAIMS ABOUT FUTURE SUFFERING ARE INHERENTLY UNCERTAIN
Claiming that no actual animal welfare law will significantly reduce animal
suffering is simply a conclusory assertion that is at best unfalsifiable and at worst
false. Asserting that animal welfare laws will likely increase future animal
suffering by delaying abolition is similarly conclusory and either false or
falsifiable. This claim also presupposes that abolition of the property status of
animals will be achieved, which is a dubious assumption.100 Finally, even if the
assumption that animal abolition will be realized is credited, there is little reason
to believe that it is true—as abolitionists routinely argue—that favoring animal
welfare statutes that presently reduce animal suffering will end up producing a
net increase in suffering in the future because these laws delay abolition.101
One problem with arguing that animal welfare laws will end up increasing
future animal suffering is that the future is uncertain. For one, humans may be
extinct in the distant future. As John Maynard Keynes famously said, “in the long
run we are all dead.”102 If this were the case, we should reduce the suffering of
animals in the present, for there may not be a future. There are also new
technologies being developed that may have a considerable impact on how much
animals suffer in the future. For example, we may eventually devise ways of
creating real meat without harming a real animal.103 While this may sound like
100. The assumption is even more dubious in light of the prevalence of pet ownership in America. See AM.
PET PROD. ASS’N, supra note 87.
101. See supra Part II.A.
102. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1st ed. 1923, reprt. 1924).
103. This may be done by painlessly harvesting cells from living animals. The result is so-called “cultured
meat.” Cultured meat has already been produced, albeit in small quantities. See, e.g., What is Cultured Beef?,
MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY, https://culturedbeef.org/what-cultured-meat/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2016).
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science fiction, a group of scientists was recently able to create the first lab grown
beef burger.104 In August 2013, Professor Mark Post and his group of scientists at
Maastricht University in the Netherlands unveiled a burger that was created from
stem cells taken from a cow that were subsequently grown into strips of muscle
and eventually pulled together to create a burger patty.105 The burger was then
cooked by a famous English chef and presented to a food critic for a tasting. After
consuming the lab-grown burger, the critic remarked that “[t]here is really a bite
to it, there is quite some flavour with the browning . . . it’s close to meat, it’s not
that juicy, but the consistency is perfect.”106 The critic concluded his review by
asserting that “this is meat to me.”107 As it turns out, cultured meat may not only
one day prevent the slaughtering of animals for meat consumption, but it may
also prove to have considerably less environmental impact than producing meat
from real animals in farms and factories. A study published in 2011 concluded
that, while there are many uncertainties inherent in the analysis, “the overall
environmental impacts of cultured meat production are substantially lower than
those of conventionally produced meat.”108
Given the potential environmental and ethical advantages of cultured meat
over farmed meat, investors are paying increasing attention to the “test tube
meat” phenomenon. The interest is such that on February 4, 2016, a startup
company called Memphis Meats made its debut at a venture capital conference in
San Francisco.109 The company is already growing small quantities of real meat
and they plan to offer hot dogs, sausages, burgers, and meatballs for sale in less
than five years.110 The CEO of the company boldly stated that they “plan to do to
animal agriculture what the car did to the horse and buggy.”111 He believes that
“[c]ultured meat will completely replace the status quo and make raising animals
to eat them simply unthinkable.”112
It is too early to tell if the cultured meat movement is a passing fad or has
considerable staying power. Cultured meat producers will need to overcome
several difficult obstacles, including scaling production so the product can be
104. Pallab Ghosh, World’s First Lab-Grown Burger is Eaten in London, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-23576143.
105. Id.
106. Melissa Hogenboom, What does a Stem Cell Burger Taste Like?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-23529841.
107. Id.
108. Hanna L. Tuomisto & M. Joost Teixeira de Mattos, Environmental Impacts of Cultured Meat
Production, 45 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 6117, 6117 (2011).
109. See Erica Shafer, Cultured Meat Comes to Memphis, MEATPOULTRY (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.
meatpoultry.com/articles/news_home/Business/2016/02/Cultured_meat_comes_to_Memphis.aspx?ID%7BA
3012483-3E47-4ADC-94DF-A6453D16CBDC%7D&cck1.
110. Bruce Friedrich, Clean Meat Company Memphis Meats Profiled in Today’s Wall Street Journal, Makes
Global Debut, THE GOOD FOOD INSTITUTE (Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.gfi.org/memphis-meats-cultured-meat-
company-profiled.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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priced competitively, and convincing people to choose cultured meat over more
“naturally” grown farmed meat.113 Given this uncertainty, no one can be sure
cultured meat will eventually replace what today we call “conventionally” grown
meat. For the same reason, we cannot be sure that conventionally grown meat
will not be replaced by cultured meat.
What we can be sure of, however, is that animal advocates have to give serious
consideration to the impact that cultured meat may have on animal welfare. If
cultured meat does end up replacing farmed meat, then the suffering of many—if
not most—factory-farmed animals will come to an end. While it is difficult to tell
the likelihood of this taking place, abolitionists cannot ignore this possible
outcome when they assess whether animal welfare laws will generate a net
reduction in future animal suffering. The likelier that this outcome becomes, the
more difficult it is for the abolitionist to oppose present-day animal welfare
reforms, given that whatever negative impact such reforms may have on future
animal suffering would be clearly offset by the enormous reduction in suffering
that replacing conventionally grown meat with cultured meat would generate.
B. INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER FOR FACTORY FARMED
ANIMALS TO NOT EXIST
Setting aside the somewhat futuristic scenario of cultured meat, another
problem with the abolitionist claim that animal welfare laws will likely end up
increasing suffering in the long run is that it is unclear how one should compare
the relative value of suffering today with the value of suffering in the future.
Opposing animal welfare regulations that reduce present suffering by arguing
that these laws will lead to increases in future suffering raises the complex
philosophical issue of “intergenerational justice.” Simply stated, the problem of
intergenerational justice is determining whether present generations owe any
duties to future generations.114 If present generations do owe a duty to future
generations, we must then assess the nature of our obligations to future genera-
tions. We must also determine how to balance the duties we owe to present
generations with the obligations owed to future generations.115
113. Given the public’s reaction to genetically modified organisms (GMOs), cultured meat producers have a
tall hill to climb if they want to convince people to shift from naturally produced meat to cultured meat. For a
discussion of public opposition to GMOs, see Stefaan Blancke, Why People Oppose GMOs Even Though
Science Says they are Safe, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
why-people-oppose-gmos-even-though-science-says-they-are-safe/.
114. In more technical terms, intergenerational justice deals with “the equitable distribution of benefits and
burdens across different generations.” Edward A. Page, Intergenerational Justice of What: Welfare, Resources
or Capabilities?, 16 ENVTL. POL. 453, 453 (2007).
115. Id.
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One of the biggest challenges in intergenerational justice is assessing whether
it is morally wrong to bring a flawed being into existence.116 In more concrete
terms, the problem is whether it is best for a flawed being to exist than not exist.
Abolitionists assume it is best that farm animals not exist at all. The lives of these
animals are not worth living because they are full of suffering, pain, and even
torture.117 The validity of this claim presupposes that it is better to not exist than
to live a life full of pain. But this is not necessarily true. Some argue that—from
the perspective of the animal—it is better for farmed animals to exist—even
in the condition in which they live—than for them not to exist.118 Abolitionists
would, of course, take issue with this claim. They would point out that given the
suffering that factory farmed animals have to endure, it is better for these animals
that they not exist than to live in the abhorrent circumstances in which they
live.119
I happen to sympathize with the claim that some lives are not worth living and
that factory-farmed animals are better off never having existed. Nevertheless, I
believe—as I assume many do—that the lives of animals raised in non-factory
farms are worth living even if the animal will end up being slaughtered for food.
These animals by and large lead relatively normal lives.120 It is unclear why it is
better that these creatures not exist than for them to exist in these conditions.
While the same cannot be said of most factory farmed animals today, it could be
said of factory farmed animals in the future if animal welfare regulations are
adopted that significantly reduce the suffering of factory farmed animals.
If this were the case, it is difficult to make sense of the abolitionist claim that
animal welfare laws that reduce suffering today should be opposed because they
would produce a net increase in future suffering. The claim presupposes that the
increase in future suffering is due to the “soothe the conscience” effect of animal
welfare regulation, which then leads to an increase in the amount of factory-
farmed animals.121 But why is it wrong to increase the number of factory-farmed
animals when the living conditions in the factory farm of the future could be
considerably better than the living conditions of present-day factory farms,
precisely because of the effect of increased animal welfare regulation? It could be
plausibly argued that—assuming increasingly stringent animal welfare regula-
tion—the lives of future generations of factory farmed animals, unlike the lives
116. See, e.g., John Harris, The Wrong of Wrongful Life, 17 J. L. & SOC’Y 90 (1990).
117. See, e.g., Henry S. Salt, The Logic of the Larder, in THE HUMANITIES OF DIET: SOME REASONINGS AND
RHYMINGS (The Vegetarian Soc’y 1914), http://www.abolitionist.com/resource/logic-of-the-larder.html.
118. See Robin Hanson, Why Meat Is Moral, and Veggies Are Immoral, ROBIN HANSON’S HOME PAGE (July
10, 2002), http://mason.gmu.edu/rhanson/meat.html.
119. Salt, supra note 117.
120. For a comparison of the lives of family farmed and industrially farmed animals, see Industrial vs.
Family Farms Comparison, BEYOND FACTORY FARMING, http://www.beyondfactoryfarming.org/get-informed/
industrial-vs-family-farms-comparison (last visited Sept. 6, 2016).
121. See Colb, supra note 54.
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of present day factory farmed animals, will be worth living. If the lives of future
factory farmed animals are likely going to be worth living, then objecting to
animal welfare laws arguing that such statutes will likely increase future
consumption of factory farmed animals loses most of its bite. Abolitionists are, of
course, still free to object to these statutes on deontological grounds, but
objecting to them on the basis that they are likely to increase future suffering is
called into question by the foregoing analysis of intergenerational justice.
C. NOT CARING ABOUT SUFFERING IS UNREASONABLE
A way for abolitionists to sidestep the “abolitionist’s dilemma” is to deny that
the so-called consequentialist claim is essential to the abolitionist program. They
could allege that they claim animal welfare laws should be opposed because they
will end up increasing animal suffering as a way of engaging with welfarists on
their own terms. Since the core abolitionist claim that animal welfare regulation
should be opposed because it continues to presuppose the property status of
animals is unlikely to convince welfarists, abolitionists may find it strategically
beneficial to claim that animal welfare laws fail even on suffering-reducing
welfarist grounds. Thus framed, abolitionists could argue that the claim that
animal welfare laws should be opposed because they do not meaningfully reduce
animal suffering is not essential to the abolitionist program. Once the claim is not
viewed as essential to abolitionism, proving the falsity of the claim would not
threaten the conceptual program of abolitionism. At most, it would undermine the
abolitionist attempt to defeat welfarists on their own terms, but it would do little
to undermine abolitionism itself.
This attempt to sidestep the abolitionist dilemma is problematic for two
reasons. First, it is unclear if abolitionists can prominently feature suffering-
reducing arguments in their writings while simultaneously minimizing the import
of these arguments. Either the suffering-reducing argument is central to the
abolitionist program or it is not. If it is essential to their program, then it is in
tension with the core abolitionist claim that any measure that presupposes the
property status of animals should be opposed regardless of consequentialist
arguments to the contrary. If, on the other hand, suffering-reducing arguments are
not essential to the abolitionist program because they are merely part of a strategy
to engage with welfarists on their own terms, then the prominence with which
these arguments are featured in abolitionist writings is puzzling. Why expend so
much effort and resources arguing about whether animal welfare regulation
meaningfully reduces animal suffering when this claim is of little consequence to
the abolitionist program? This once again highlights the abolitionist’s dilemma.
The most plausible explanations for why abolitionists spend so much time
making suffering-reducing arguments are either that these arguments are an
essential component of the abolitionist program or that abolitionists must make
these kinds of arguments to remain politically relevant. Abolitionists cannot
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escape the dilemma by pointing out that they care about suffering-reducing
arguments solely as a way to prove welfarists wrong. Even if this claim is
believed, the political palatability of the abolitionist program depends on whether
they can, in fact, prove that welfarists are wrong. If welfarist regulations actually
succeed in meaningfully reducing animal suffering, then abolitionists would only
have two options. They could embrace animal welfare regulations, in which case
their position would not be meaningfully different from welfarism, or they could
oppose animal welfare regulations that reduce animal suffering solely because
they continue to commoditize animals. The former position risks collapsing
abolitionism into welfarism. The latter position risks turning abolitionism into a
politically irrelevant program. The dilemma persists.
Second, an abolitionist program that cares about suffering-reducing claims for
purely strategic reasons is normatively unattractive, if not downright unreason-
able. Setting aside the desirability of abolishing the property status of animals, an
approach to animal ethics that ignores the current suffering of animals is woefully
unappealing. Even if the ultimate goal of abolitionism is to end the commoditiza-
tion of animals, it stands to reason that abolitionists ought to care about how
animals are treated between now and abolition. If so, abolitionists have non-
strategic reasons to support animal welfare regulation that results in meaningful
reduction of animal suffering, even if such regulation continues to presuppose the
property status of animals.122 Failure to do so would reveal that abolitionists
prioritize philosophical purity over the actual wellbeing of nonhuman animals; it
would demonstrate that abolitionists are willing to sacrifice animal welfare in
the present with the hopes of achieving an uncertain and unlikely abolition in the
future. It is simply unreasonable for an animal advocate to oppose welfare
regulations that significantly improve the wellbeing of animals, even if the
statutes do not advance the attainment of abolition.
An analogy further illustrates the point. Some criminal law scholars are
“prison abolitionists.”123 Prison abolitionists believe that state inflicted imprison-
ment is never justified. As a result, the ultimate goal of prison abolitionists is to
abolish imprisonment.124 In spite of their ultimate objective, it would be sensible
for imprisonment abolitionists to support measures that meaningfully reduce the
suffering of prison inmates even if such measures do little to abolish imprison-
ment. It would be unreasonable for imprisonment abolitionists to oppose such
measures simply because they fail to advance the abolishment of imprisonment;
122. Abolitionists could, of course, claim that they do not support animal welfare laws because they are not
likely to reduce animal suffering in a meaningful way. For the reasons pointed out in parts II and III, there is no
empirical support for this claim. There is, however, empirical support for the claim that animal welfare laws do,
in fact, reduce animal suffering.
123. See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003).
124. Id.
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adopting this stance prioritizes a philosophical goal over the actual suffering of
hundreds of thousands of human beings.
For the same reasons, it would be callous for an animal ethics abolitionist to
oppose animal cruelty legislation that meaningfully reduces suffering solely
because it continues to assume the property status of animals. Therefore, animal ethics
abolitionists have no choice but to care in a non-strategic way about animal suffering
and, consequently, about the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of animal welfare legisla-
tion. Not caring about animal suffering or caring about it only in a strategic way would
make the abolitionist position not only politically unpalatable, but also ethically
unattractive in a most profound kind of way. As a result, there are good reasons to
consider the suffering-reducing argument an essential and non-strategic part of the
abolitionist program.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that abolitionists cannot profess support or opposition to animal
welfare statutes without either calling into question some of their most deeply
held views or condemning abolitionism to political irrelevance. More specifi-
cally, I have argued that animal rights abolitionism in its current form cannot
avoid either collapsing into a form of welfarism or retrenching into a politically
unpalatable approach to animal ethics that is indifferent to actual animal suffering
because it solely cares about abolishing the property status of animals.
It is best for abolitionism to collapse into a form of welfarism because the
alternative of embracing a fully non-consequentialist approach to animal ethics is
unappealing. This is because the view that it is a profound moral wrong to own
animals regardless of how well the animals are treated is too eccentric to have any
significant strategic purchase. Since abolitionism is a political movement, its
success is measured by the amount of change it can effect in the world. Moreover,
its success will inevitably be measured against the success that so-called welfarist
animal advocacy groups have in pushing reforms that benefit animals. While
abolitionists seek change by asking individuals to turn to veganism, welfarist
groups have been busy pushing legal reforms designed to reduce animal suffering
in many states. It is easy to see why welfarists seem to be doing much more to
benefit animals than abolitionists. If abolitionism were purely a philosophical
position, this would matter little. However, since abolitionism is ultimately a
political program, abolitionists must feel compelled to explain to the public in
general and to animal advocates in particular why—in spite of how busy
welfarists look—welfarist reforms actually do little to benefit animals. Failure to
address this issue is not an option for abolitionists, since people who care about
animals would have little reason to turn to abolitionism and veganism if welfarist
regulations were succeeding in meaningfully reducing animal suffering.
If abolitionists remained faithful to their philosophical commitments, they
would simply oppose animal welfare reforms by pointing out that animal welfare
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regulation is morally abhorrent because it continues to presuppose the property
status of animals. They balk at doing so because the argument that owning
animals is morally wrong simply fails to resonate with the vast majority of the
population.125 Therefore, they supplement their deontological claim with the
much more palatable claim that welfarist reforms should be opposed because
they will end up increasing animal suffering in the long run. In doing so,
abolitionists have unwittingly hinged their political program on a consequential-
ist argument against animal welfare statutes that is subject to being proved or
disproved empirically.
While necessary to gain political traction, this strategic move threatens to
unravel abolitionism by shifting the locus of animal ethics from the abolitionist
worry about the property status of animals to the welfarist concern about the
suffering of animals. Ultimately, then, abolitionists are able to retain political
relevance only by shying away from their core commitment to a deontological
approach to animal ethics premised on the principle that it is morally abhorrent to
treat animals as property. The end result is a watered-down version of abolition-
ism that rises or falls depending on whether they successfully demonstrate that
welfarist reforms fail to make animals better off. This version of abolitionism is
consequentialist in nature, as its success depends on whether the abolitionist
program is better or worse than the classic welfarist program at reducing the
suffering of animals. Abolitionism thus collapses into a form of welfarism
that—for strategic reasons—cannot avoid putting forth consequentialist argu-
ments in support or opposition to animal welfare regulations.
125. See AM. PET PROD. ASS’N, supra note 87.
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